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Perception, Action, and Experience: Unraveling the Golden Braid*? 
Andy Clark 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Much of our human mental life looks to involve a seamless unfolding of 
perception, action and experience: a golden braid in which each element twines 
intimately with the rest. We see the very world we act in and we act in the 
world we see. But more than this, visual experience presents us with the world 
in a way apt for the control and fine guidance of action. Or so it seems. Milner 
and Goodale's ((1995) (2006)) influential work on the dual visual systems 
hypothesis casts doubt on certain versions of this intuitive vision. It does so by 
prising apart the twining strands of conscious visual perception and the fine 
control of visuomotor action. Such a bold proposal is of major interest both to 
cognitive science and philosophy. In what follows I first clarify the major 
claims that the bold proposal involves, then examine three sets of worries and 
objections. The first set concern some important matters of detail. The second 
set concern a certain kind of conceptual or philosophical worry to the effect 
that the perception/action model unfairly equates visual experience itself with 
what are in fact certain elements within visual experience. The third set concern 
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the very idea of conscious experience as a well-defined conceptual or 
experimental target.  
 
Keywords: Vision, Dual Visual Systems, Consciousness, Action, Visual 
Experience 
 
1. A Bold Proposal: Vision for Perception, Vision for Action. 
 
Milner and Goodale's bold proposal offers a certain functional gloss on the 
anatomical complexity of the visual system. This gloss takes as its starting point 
the existence of two major processing streams (the ventral and the dorsal) 
projecting from early visual areas to the rest of the human brain. Ungerleider 
and Mishkin (1982) famously depicted these as the 'what' and 'where' streams, 
each specialized to perceive different aspects of the visual world. On this view, 
both streams contributed contents (though different ones) to human visual 
experience. Milner and Goodale (1995) described and defended an alternative 
functional gloss, according to which one stream supports 'vision-for-action' and 
the other 'vision-for-perception'. Thus the dorsal stream, projecting to the 
posterior parietal cortex, is said to support the kinds of visuomotor 
transformation in which visual input leads to fluent actions such as reaching 
and grasping, while the ventral stream, projecting to the temporal lobe, seems 
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to be especially implicated in the recognition and identification of objects and 
events. Milner and Goodale (1995) and Goodale and Milner (2004) further 
suggest that  the dorsal stream computes 'vision-for-action' in a way that is fast, 
transient, and unconscious, and that the ventral stream computes  'vision-for-
perception' in a way that is slower, more enduring, and at least sometimes 
sometimes conscious.  The contents of conscious visual experience, for Milner 
and Goodale, are thus strongly associated with the coding and processing 
operations carried out by the ventral stream.  
 
To illustrate the way these two streams are then meant to interact, Goodale and 
Milner (2004) develop an analogy with tele-assistance approaches to the control 
of distant robots in distant or hostile environments. Here, a conscious human 
operator and a non-conscious semi-intelligent distal robot combine forces so as 
to perform actions in some environment (for example, in the control of a Mars 
rover, where the human operator reviews images on a screen in Texas, flagging 
items of interest that the robot can locate and retrieve using its own on-board 
sensory systems and sensorimotor routines. Such approaches are contrasted 
with tele-operation solutions, in which the conscious human operator controls 
all the spatial and temporal aspects of the robots movements (perhaps via a 
joystick or a set of sensors that allow the operators own arm and hand 
movements to be relayed to the robot). The tele-assistance analogy thus 
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identifies the role of the conscious human operator with the role of the ventral 
stream (working in concert with stored memory and various 'executive control' 
systems). The task of this coalition, the analogy suggests, is to identify objects 
and to select types of action that are appropriate given the agent's current goals, 
background knowledge, and currently attended perceptual input. The task of 
the dorsal stream (and associated structures) is then to turn these high-level 
specifications into metrically accurate, egocentrically specified forms of world-
engaging action. The dorsal stream (plus associated structures) thus plays the 
non-conscious robotic Mars Rover to the ventral coalition's conscious human 
operator, such that: 
 
"Both systems have to work together in the production of purposive 
behavior- one system to select the goal object from the visual array, the 
other to carry out the required metrical computations for the goal-
directed action." (Goodale and Milner (2004) p.100) 
 
 
This picture of the distinct but interlocking contributions of the two visual 
streams explains some of the coarse dissociations and psychophysical effects 
described in the literature. In particular, this account of the division of labour 
offers a neat explanation of the differing pattern of deficits seen in patients 
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with lesions affecting one or other of the two streams. Thus ventrally 
compromised patients (such as DF) display severe impairments in recognizing 
shapes, orientations, and objects. Not only can DF not recognize most 
everyday objects, or faces, she cannot distinguish between squares, rectangles, 
triangles and circles. In the famous 'mailbox' task DF was pretty well at chance 
for turning a handheld card to match the perceived orientation of a posting 
slot. Yet asked to actually post the card through the slot she was almost 
indistinguishable from normal controls (see Milner and Goodale (1995) pp 128-
133). On an intuitive model, DF's apparent lack of conscious visual awareness 
of features such as shape and orientation might suggest that she has (for 
whatever reason) simply failed to compute the very information needed to 
guide the relevant visuomotor actions. Yet her fluent performance belies this. 
The dual streams/tele-assistance model accounts for this, since the visual 
information required to support the world-engaging action is computed 
independently (though on the basis of the same retinal input) of the 
information required to support conscious identificationi.  
 
Moving to the case of normal, unimpaired subjects, the same story neatly 
accounts for work by Aglioti at al (1995). In this work, the experimenters set up 
a graspable version of the famous Ebbinghaus or 'Titchener Circles' visual 
illusion in which two central circles are presented, surrounded by a ring of 
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other circles. In one case, the surrounding circles are larger than the central 
one. In the other, they are smaller. This leads to the well-known illusions in 
which subjects misjudge the relative size of the two central circles. Such 
mistaken estimates of relative size do not, however, affect subjects' abilities (in 
the physical, poker chip version) to form precision grips that perfectly 
anticipate the true size of the centre discs. The explanation, according to 
Goodale and Milner (2004, pp 88-89) is that the conscious scene is computed 
by the ventral stream in ways that are at liberty to make a variety of 
assumptions on the basis of visual cues (e.g. attempting to preserve size 
constancy by treating the smaller circles as probably further away than the 
larger ones). The dorsal stream, by contrast, uses only the kinds of information 
that are metrically reliable and exploit specific opportunities for elegant, fast, 
metrically accurate diagnosis. For example, the dorsal stream may make great 
use of binocular depth information. These differences in processing, combined 
with the quasi-independent modes of operation of the two streams, account for 
the illusion's ability to impact conscious visual experience while leaving our 
visuomotor engagements intact.  
 
More recently, a similar effect has been shown using the so-called 'hollow face 
illusion'. In this illusion a concave model of a human face appears convex, due 
to the influence of top-down knowledge concerning normal human faces. This 
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suggests it is a purely ventral stream based illusion. Kroliczak et al (2006) 
showed that in a task where subjects were asked to flick small targets off the 
actually hollow (though visually convex) face, the flicking movements found 
the real (non-illusory) locations of the targets. According to Milner and 
Goodale: 
 
"This demonstrates that the visuomotor system can use bottom-up 
sensory inputs…to guide movements to the veridical locations of targets 
in the real world, even when the perceived positions of the targets are 
influenced, or even reversed, by top-down processing"  
Milner and Goodale (2006) p.245 
 
Such demonstrations, and the more general issue of perception-action 
dissociations and visual illusions, have spawned a large and complex literature 
devoted to the search for counter-examples, alternative explanations, 
exceptions, refinements, and additional support (for some useful reviews, see 
Carey (2001), Clark (2001), Goodale and Westwood (2004))ii. 
 
Aspects of the dual visual systems picture are supported by a large and 
impressively varied body of evidence including  a swathe of neuroimaging 
experiments (e.g. Le et al (2002), James et al (2003)), a wide variety of single cell 
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recordings and other experimental interventions in monkeys (Taira et al (1990) 
Sakata (2003)), and psychophysical experiments involving normal human 
subjects (Bridgeman et al (1979), Goodale et al (1986), Fecteau et al (2001), and 
(as we just saw) Aglioti et al (1995)). More generally, it may be observed that 
the online control of motor action requires the extraction and use of radically 
different kinds of information (from the incoming visual signal) than do the 
tasks of recognition, recall and reasoning. The former requires a constantly 
updated, (multiply) egocentrically-specified, exquisitely distance and orientation 
sensitive encoding of the visual array. The latter requires the computation of 
object-constancy (objects don't change their identity every time they move in 
space) and the recognition of items by category and significance irrespective of 
the fine detail of location, viewpoint and retinal image size. A computationally 
efficient coding for either task thus looks to preclude the use of the very same 
encoding for the other (Milner and Goodale (1995) 25-66). Different uses of 
visual information impose quite different computational demands on the brain, 
so there are compelling computational and information-processing 
considerations that speak in favor of a dual (or at any rate, multiple) visual 
systems architecture. But just how all this in turn lines up with issues 
concerning conscious and non-conscious vision remains open to question, as 
we shall see. 
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2. Complications 
The very strongest claim in this area, that the  contents of conscious visual 
experience are exclusively determined by the coding and processing operations 
carried out by the ventral stream, now looks to be empirically suspectiii. Schenk 
and Milner (2006) show that form  discrimination, in the visual form agnosic 
DF, can be improved if she engages in a concurrent visuomotor task. 
Specifically, when asked to name the shape of a visually presented object while 
reaching for the object, performance on the naming task was significantly 
improved. Further experiments ruled out the suggestion that this effect is due 
to DF using proprioceptive or efferent cues, suggesting instead that she is able 
directly to access shape-relevant information (in fact, it turns out to be 
information about width) being processed by the dorsal stream. This means 
that DF's shape judgements can be influenced by ongoing dorsal stream 
activity. Does this mean that processing in the dorsal stream can contribute to 
the contents of DF's visual experience? It is not clear. For the possibility 
remains that the dorsal influence provides only some kind of elusive, non-visual 
cue. As the authors put it: 
 
"better 'discrimination' does not necessarily imply better 'perception', 
and instead Df could have been employing some indefinable 'implicit' 
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cues of the kind that enable blindsight patients to perform above chance 
in discrimination tasks." Schenk and Milner (2006) p. 1502 
 
It has also been suggested (Matthen (2005)) that dorsal processing may 
contribute a kind of non-specific 'feeling of presence' to our contact with the 
visual scene. To bring this idea into focus, it helps first to distinguish, following 
Matthen, 'descriptive' from 'motion-guiding' vision. Descriptive vision, as 
Matthen uses the term, corresponds rather closely to the kind of vision 
supported by ventral stream coding. It is the kind of vision that supports 
sensory classification, allowing us to experience the scene as composed of 
objects and elements that might be classified as similar or different in such-and-
such sensory (visual) respects. Descriptive vision is thus, as we might say, 
'epistemically pregnant': it presents the visual world in ways that are apt for 
reasoning about that world (see Clark (2001)). Matthen contrasts descriptive 
vision and 'motion-guiding vision', identifying the latter as supported by both 
non-cortical routes and the dorsal (cortical) stream. According to Matthen (op 
cit p 296) "the link between motion-guiding vision and bodily motion is direct; 
it is not routed through consciousness". Conscious seeing may, of course, 
provide the information that leads us to choose a certain target and a certain 
type of action. But it does not provide moment-by-moment guidance of fine 
visuomotor action. This picture thus comports nicely with Milner and 
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Goodale's view concerning the non-conscious nature of the processing and 
control operations carried out by the dorsal stream. Nonetheless, Matthen 
suggests, there is at least one way in which that picture may be incomplete. For 
it fails to recognize the dorsal processing origins of the 'feeling of presence' that 
accompanies many of our visual encounters with the world. The idea here is 
that the kinds of metrically accurate depth and location information computed 
by the dorsal stream allow us to feel that we are really in the presence of, say, a 
cup and not merely seeing a 2D drawing or photograph of a cup. This feeling 
of presence (which can be at least partially duped by some kinds of two 
dimensional depiction) is said to form a genuine part of our visual experience. 
Even though it is not part of 'descriptive vision', it  "makes a difference to the 
quality of one's visual awareness of an object" (op cit p.301).  
 
 
Rizzolatti and Matelli (2003), and Gallese (2007), suggest that the 
dorsal/ventral distinction itself is too coarse-grained, and should be replaced by 
a tripartite distinction between dorso-dorsal, ventro-dorsal, and ventral streams 
(for the anatomical details, see Gallese (op cit) sections 2-4). The dorso-dorsal 
stream is said to support fast, non-conscious visuomotor transformations, just 
as envisaged by Milner and Goodale. While the ventral stream, again as Milner 
and Goodale suggest, supports object identification and classification. But the 
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ventro-dorsal stream, though itself anatomically part of the dorsal stream, 
nonetheless contributes, these authors suggest, to the determination of 
conscious experience. One major way it does so, it is argued, is by supporting 
the conscious visual experience of others' intentional actions. Such a suggestion 
gains plausibility if one way in which we come to grasp the nature and goals of 
others' observed actions is by activating our own motor systems, perhaps under 
the influence of mirror system (Rizzolatti et al (1996)) processing. The ventro-
dorsal stream is also said to be essential for the conscious visual awareness of 
space as an arena for our own motor activity, as when we see objects as 
reachable, or as manipulable in such and such ways. Holding both these strands 
together is the guiding idea that parieto pre-motor circuits support various 
forms of 'embodied simulation' (Gallese (2005)) such that "side-by-side with 
the sensory description of the observed phenomena, the motor schemata 
associated with these actions, or objects, are evoked in the observer" (Gallese 
(2007) p.14). These active motor schemas are said to be the mechanism by 
which "conscious awareness of actions and spatial locations are generated" (op 
cit). 
 
In this section we have scouted what are perhaps best seen as a series of 
complications: refinements and additions to the strong dual visual systems 
view. Though outstanding questions remainiv, accommodating these 
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refinements and additions leaves intact many of the central tenets of the 
account. Other challenges, however, go deeper than this, some of them 
threatening even the claims concerning the non-conscious status of the basic 
(dorso-dorsal) visuomotor transformation itself. It is to these challenges that 
we now turn. 
 
 
 
3. The 'Narrow Vision of Conscious Vision' Worry 
 
Milner and Goodale's bold proposal is, as we have already begun to see, subject 
to an interesting and important (though initially somewhat elusive) kind of 
worry. We can dub it the 'Narrow Vision of Conscious Vision' worry. The 
worry takes many shapes and forms, some of them more plausible, and some 
of them less elusive, (and some both), than others. What they all have in 
common is the thought that the bold proposal illicitly identifies conscious 
visual experience with one or more of the components, forms, or styles, of 
conscious visual experience. That is to say, conscious visual experience may 
involve many different 'things', supported by many different processing streams 
and neural coalitions, and it would be a mistake to identify conscious vision 
with just one of them.  
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An analogyv may be is helpful here. Visual and auditory experience are different 
phenomena, and depend on different mechanisms and forms of internal 
processing. In the light of this mundane fact, we would be wrong to identify 
what we perceptually experience (in general) with what we visually experience. 
Correlatively, we would be wrong to simply identify the mechanisms of 
perceptual experience with the mechanisms of visual experience. Now suppose 
that within the realm of visual experience itself there exist multiple quite 
different varieties of experiential phenomena, each supported by different types 
or forms of mechanism and processing. Suppose too that one or more such 
elements turns out to depend preferentially, just as Milner and Goodale 
suggest, upon processing in the ventral visual stream. Still it would not follow 
that conscious visual experience itself (in all its varieties) depends preferentially 
upon processing in that stream. To do so would be to fall prey to what I am 
calling a "Narrow Vision of Conscious Vision" error. 
 
 
Here are two (distinct but related) versions of the 'narrow vision' worry drawn 
from the recent philosophical and cognitive neuroscientific literature: 
 
3.1 Comparing Like with Like 
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Jeannerod and Jacob (2005) make a strong case that simple comparisons 
between the contributions of the dorsal and ventral streams are misleading 
insofar as they fail to control for three factors. The factors concern direction of 
fit, direction of causation, and level of processing. Let's take the first two first. 
The underlying model here is the philosophical distinction (Anscombe (1957), 
Searle (1983)) between states that are belief-like and states that are desire-like. 
Beliefs have a mind-to-world direction of fit, and a world-to-mind direction of 
causation. That is, a belief  is a mental state that aims to fit the way the world is 
(thus, it exhibits a mind-to-world direction of fit). One good way to ensure that 
kind of fit is for it to be caused by the way the world is (thus also exhibiting 
world-to-mind direction of causation). Desires, by contrast describe ways the 
world should be (they exhibit world-to-mind direction of fit), and they may 
function so as to help bring it about that the world be that way (thus displaying 
a mind-to-world direction of causation). Notice, then, that different attitudes 
(belief versus desire) are here distinguished in part in terms of their direction of 
fit. Thus an agent may be said to be in states that share a content (eg that the 
shops be open) with differences in attitude (one may believe it, another hope it, 
another fear it).  
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Apart from this question about direction of it, there is a question concerning 
nature and level of processing. Thus consider next the various ways an active 
agent may need to use visually presented information. The information may be 
used to ensure that they know how things are out in the world. Jeannerod and 
Jacob (op cit p.3) call this the 'semantic processing of visual information' Or (or 
in addition) it may be used to help act upon, and alter, that world. They call this 
the 'pragmatic processing of visual information'. Semantic processing has a 
belief-like profile, exhibiting a mind-to-world direction of fit and a world-to-
mind direction of causation. Pragmatic processing has a more desire-like 
profilevi, exhibiting a world-to-mind direction of fit and a mind-to-world 
direction of causation. Moreover, each kind of processing involves many levels 
of abstraction. Early stages of semantic processing yield representations with 
'pictorial non-conceptual contents' (for present purposes, we can think of these 
as essentially 'iconic', non-propositionally structured contents, in the sense of 
Coltheart (1983), but see Clark (2001) for further discussion). Later stages yield 
representations whose contents are more structured and highly processed, 
presenting a world of objects, relations, and attributes, in ways apt to inform 
processes of explicit reasoning and planning. Similarly, early stages of pragmatic 
processing are said to represent basic geometrical properties (width, as it figures 
in the Schenk and Milner results discussed in section 2, would be one such 
property) of objects in ways apt for the guidance of actions such as fluent 
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reaching and grasping, while later stages yield more abstract, or 'conceptual' 
representations. Crucially, according to Jeannerod and Jacob: 
 
"The scope of pragmatic processing… is not limited to the visuomotor 
transformation, since pragmatic processing is involved in conceptually 
more complex operations like evaluating the feasibility of an action, 
anticipating its consequences, planning further steps, and learning the 
skilled use of tools by observation"  
Jeannerod and Jacob (2005) p 5 
 
The upshot is that: 
 
"The visuomotor transformation is but a first, lower level component, of 
the human 'pragmatic processing' of objects. [We should] contrast this 
lower level pragmatic processing with a higher level of pragmatic 
processing of objects involved in the skilled use and manipulation of 
complex cultural tools and artifacts" 
Jacob and Jeannerrod (2003) xviii 
 
These higher levels of pragmatic processing reach, the authors argue, all the 
way up to representations with consciously accessible contents, as in the case 
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where we experience motor imagery involving the manipulation of these 
complex tools and artifacts. Such uses go well beyond simple grasping and 
involve the retrieval of what Jacob and Jeannerod ((2003) p. 216) call 'stored 
scripts' for the manipulation and use of cultural objects. At this point, the 
authors argue "the distinction between action and perception loses much of its 
significance" (Jacob and Jeannerod (2003) p 253).  
 
Let's return now to Milner and Goodale's bold proposal. The deepest worry 
raised by Jeannerod and Jacob may be put like this: we should be wary of 
conclusions (concerning the functional roles of the dorsal and ventral streams, 
and the alignments of those roles with conscious visual experience) that do not 
compare like with like. In particular, we should be wary of conclusions reached 
by comparing early levels of pragmatic processing with later levels of semantic processing. 
Early stages of pragmatic processing (those devoted to the basic visuomotor 
transform) involve representations with little or no conceptual content, and 
these are indeed not the kind of content that normally figure in our own 
experience. But early levels of semantic processing, which fall short of 
identifying or classifying objects, are similarly silent, phenomenally speaking. 
While later stages of both semantic and pragmatic processing involve contents 
that are not silent: that are present to phenomenal awareness. If we keep the 
nature and levels of processing matched, what we find are thus not differences 
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in phenomenal status but rather differences in direction of causation and of fit. 
That is to say, we find that there are indeed (at leastvii) two distinct roles that 
visual information may be serving in the agent economy. But neither role lines 
up exclusively with conscious visual experience.  
 
 
3.2 Directive Content? 
 
But what about the basic visuomotor transformation itself? Here, Jeannerod 
and Jacob seem to accept that the processing (that involved in e.g. transforming 
visual input into fluent acts of basic reaching and grasping) fails to reach or 
inform conscious visual experience. But even this may be called into question.  
 
Thus consider once again the case of DF, the ventrally compromised carbon 
monoxide poisoned subject studied by Milner and Goodale. In an interesting 
paper, Wallhagen (2007) suggests that DF may really experience visually 
presented shape, but be unable to report that experience due to some problem 
with bringing her experience 'under concepts'. The idea is that the intact dorsal 
stream processing associated with the basic visuomotor transformation has its 
own attendant phenomenology, and that it is this attendant phenomenology 
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that explains DF's remarkably fluent visuomotor behaviour. Thus DF sees 
(visually experiences) shapes and orientations, but when asked to report on what 
she sees, she is unable (due to her compromised ventral processing) to do so.  
Not only can she not report what she sees, in a real sense she does not know 
what she sees. Just as a non-human animal, lacking the concept of 'chair', might 
well visually experience a chair yet not in any sense know it is experiencing a 
chair, so too DF might experience a world of oriented lines, shapes and forms 
but not know (neither recognize nor be able to report) that she is doing so. 
According to Wallhagen: 
 
"Aspects of form may well be phenomenally present to D.F., she may 
well consciously sense, and hence represent, the shapes, sizes, and 
orientations of things, even if she cannot properly conceptualize these 
aspects of form” Wallhagen (2007) 
 
O'Regan and Noë (2001) seem tempted by a similar thought. They describe DF 
as a case of 'partial awareness' in which 'she is unable to describe what she sees 
but is otherwise able to use it for the purpose of guiding action' (op cit p.969).  
 
These views are potentially more radical than that defended by Jeannerod and 
Jacob, since they call into question the identification (accepted by Jeannerod 
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and Jacob) of conscious perceptual contents with the more highly 
conceptualized products of later stages of (both semantic and pragmatic) 
processing. One immediate problem is that these less highly processed (more 
'unconceptualized') contents, if they are indeed consciously experienced, will 
nonetheless be hard if not impossible to bring into focus for report and 
description. For whenever we do so, we in effect move up the processing 
ladder, calling on our grasp of the scene as a structured, attended entity 
populated by nameable objects, shapes, and relations. But for the moment, let's 
bracket that worry and try to put a little more flesh on the suggestion itself. 
 
One way to think about this kind of proposal is further developed in Nudds 
(2007). Nudds, like Jeannerod and Jacob, urges us to distinguish between two 
kinds of content that visual perceptual experiences may possess. He dubs these 
the 'presentational' and the 'directive' contents of visual experience. 
Presentational contents correspond to what Matthen (2005) termed 'descriptive 
vision' and what Jeannerod and Jacob (2005) termed 'semantic processing': they 
are contents that depict how things are in the world. Directive contents 
correspond to what Matthen termed 'motion-guiding vision' and what 
Jeannerod and Jacob called 'pragmatic processing': they are concerned with 
how to guide actions so as to bring about desired results. Nudds suggestion, 
rather like that of Wallhagen, is that these contents figure in visual experience 
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and help to determine the shape and nature of our world-engaging activity. It is 
this latter claim that marks the point of departure from both Milner and 
Goodale's model and (at least for the basic visuomotor transformation) that of 
Jeannerod and Jacob)viii. 
 
Why should we believe that directive contents, associated with basic 
visuomotor transformations, form part of our conscious visual experience? 
Nudds reasoning is best appreciated in contrast to a more standard model that 
depicts consciously visually guided action as guided by conscious intentions (eg 
Peacocke (1992)). On this model visual experience presents a world relative to 
which I may form an intention (eg to pick up the coffee cup I see over there) 
that then determines the action. Such a model is consistent with (though it does 
not  commit you to) the tele-assistence image favoured by Milner and Goodale 
(see section 1 above). For it leaves room for the detailed kinematics of the 
action to be determined by something other than the content of the visual 
experience (which need only allow us to form apt intentions). But such a 
model, Nudds argues, is inadequate to explain visually-guided action. Instead, 
Nudds argues that there is a distinctive kinematics (as Milner and Goodale 
showed) to reaching and grasping performed while in visual contact with the 
scene. Remove the contact and the kinematics alter. This alteration -and this is 
crucial for his argument- is not exhaustively accounted for by an agent's 
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intentions (eg to pick up the cup, or even, moving to the higher levels of 
pragmatic processing, to use the screwdriver so as to screw in the screw), which 
may often be the same in both cases. But whereas Milner and Goodale depict 
these further precise kinematic details as determined by a non-conscious stream 
of low-level pragmatic processing, Nudds thinks this fails fully to capture the 
phenomenon. The reason he gives is that the precise way we perform the 
action seems to be something for which we (the agent, rather than just some 
subsystem of the agent's brain) are responsible. The precise way the action 
unfolds is, he suggests, something we do. That I tie my shoelaces like this is not 
something that just happens to me, or that I just find myself doing. The 
explanation, Nudds claims, is that (e.g.) the detailed lace-tying kinematics are 
driven by conscious but directive contents actually given in visual experience. 
Nonetheless we will not necessarily be well-placed to report on those contents, 
and it will not 'seem like' anything very specific  to be guided by them. This is 
because both reporting and (more generally) knowing what we are experiencing 
depend on content-monitoring capacities informed by the other 
('presentational') dimensions of conscious visual content.  
 
This is perhaps the most difficult suggestion we will examine in the present 
treatment. On this model, DF (to take one striking example) may have visual 
experiences with rich conscious directive contents that help explain her 
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successful and often self-initiated behaviorsix even though [she] “will not be 
under the impression that anything is any way, nor have any basis for judging 
that anything is any way” (Nudds (2007)). This also opens up an alternative 
interpretation of the Aglioti et al experiments rehearsed in section 1. For on 
Nudds' account visual experience guides both the action (the well-calibrated 
grasp)  and the illusion-prone verbal response, but it is the directive content of 
the experience that guides the visuomotor action and the presentational or 
descriptive content  that guides the verbal response. Both the judgment and the 
action are thus guided by (different forms of) visual experiencex. Moreover 
there is no inconsistency in the content of visual experience here, since these 
different kinds of content share no 'common currency' in which to frame a 
disagreement. 
  
 
4. The Argument from Agency 
 
In this section I aim to challenge the claim that these directive contents (both 
in DF and in neurally uncompromised subjects) are properly depicted as 
forming part of our conscious visual experience. As already noted, however, we 
cannot challenge such a claim simply by pointing to the agent's honest reports, 
since these will only reveal what is present or absent to descriptive vision. What 
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we can do, however, is attempt to gain some leverage from a simple, but I think 
plausible, observation. The observation (which may of course be doubted, as 
we'll later see) is that conscious experience must always be the experience of 
some agent. The putative directive contents of visual experience, being 
available only for one kind of purpose, and then only in highly transient form 
(that is, only while in actual contact with the visual scene), seem to fail to meet 
this requirement. They are more like encapsulated pockets of processing than 
genuine contents of visual (or any) experience. In very much this vein Gareth 
Evans once argued that an informational state may underpin a conscious 
experience only if it (the informational state) is in some sense input to a  
reasoning subject. According to Evans, to count as a conscious experience an 
informational state must:  
 
"[serve] as  the input to a thinking, concept-applying and reasoning 
system: so that the subject's thoughts, plans, and deliberations are also 
systematically dependent on the informational properties of the input. 
When there is such a link we can say that the person, rather than some 
part of his or her brain, receives and processes the information” 
 
Evans (1982) p.158 
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I think this is almost right. But the real point here is (or should be) quite 
independent of Evan's appeal to the subject as concept-using. What matters, 
rather, is that the information must be available to the agent qua 'reasoning 
subject', where this may be unpacked in many different ways, not all of them 
requiring full-blown concept-use on the part of the agent (see e.g. Hurley 
(1997), Bermudez and McPherson (1998)). As long as an animal can form 
(nonconceptualized) goals, and can become directly and non-inferentially aware 
of specific environmental opportunities that allow, or that block, the fulfillment 
of those (limited) goals and projects, then transduced information can be, or 
fail to be, input to this kind of minimal reasoning subject (for more on this 
slightly less demanding conception, see Dretske (2006), Hurley (1998) ,Clark 
(2007)). A positive suggestionxi thus emerges according to which conscious 
perceptual experience occurs when, and only when, information is poised, 
however briefly, for direct and non-inferential use in the guidance of (at least 
minimal) rational action. By contrast, the sensory transduction of visual 
information can sometimes (as in the case of blindsight) simply channel 
information so as to guide response, without providing the agent herself with 
any reasons, justifications, or rationales, for her action (see Campbell (2002), 
Dretske (2006)). In such cases, behaviour whose success depends on that very 
information will (all other things being equal) surprise the agent herself. In such 
cases, information is transduced, impacts behaviour, but is never  poised so as 
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to provide me with a reason (visible to myself as an agent) for my actions or 
choices. At other times, however, something about the form or nature of the 
processing poises specific items of transduced information in a way apt (if my 
attention is so directed) to provide me with reasons or motivations for my own 
actions and choices (to provide what Dretske (2006, p.168) calls ‘justifying 
reasons’ for my actions. Importantly, it may be (see discussion below) that even 
elements that we don't yet attend to or notice in our own visual experience can 
be thus poised, as might elements that are not yet fully conceptualized (in this 
way, as Fodor (2007) notes, even the contents of 'iconic' encodings may 
provide justifying reasons for a subsequent act  or judgement). 
 
For present purposes, what matters is that even these kinds of (weak but 
important) link between experience and agency do not seem to be present in 
the  case of (merely) directive contents. Nudds himself comments, as we saw, 
that "since directive  content doesn’t present an object as being some way, in 
having a visual experience with directive  content the subject will not be under 
the impression that anything is any way, nor have any basis for judging that 
anything is any way" (Nudds (2007)). As a result, this information will not be 
available for use in any form of practical reasoning, and will not provide the 
agent herself with any reasons (visible to herself) for her own actions. But such 
total fractionation, of the putative conscious content from what the agent 
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knows or (more generally) has reason to do, seems in conflict (I suggest) with 
the image of genuine experience being experience of the agent.  
 
5. The Most Radical Challenges 
 
Block (2007) asks a question that reaches to the very roots of current scientific 
attempts to study conscious experience. He asks how we can know whether 
some content actually forms part of our conscious experience. The answer, he 
notes, is only straightforward as long as we take reportability of content (for 
example, the broadcasting of content to a 'global workspace'xii) as a requirement 
on conscious presence.  
 
But suppose we don't. Suppose we ask, instead, whether conscious experience 
might go beyond that which we can access or report? A natural worry is that 
such a question is simply unanswerable.  Block's response to this (in part) is to 
appeal to work by Sperling (1960) and Landman et al (2003), arguing that these 
studies suggest that " in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows 
cognitive accessibility" (Block (2007) p.481). In the Sperling experimentsxiii 
subjects are briefly (50ms) shown a 3x3 grid of letters, such as: 
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   T   D    A 
   S    R    N 
   F    Z    B 
 
The stimulus grid is removed after 50 ms. Many subjects then claim to have 
had and to have briefly retained a conscious experience of all the letters, even 
though they could reliably report  (in the so-called ‘full report’ condition) only 
about 4 of them. It may seem that there is no way to empirically test whether 
the subjects actually saw (properly saw, in distinct individual detail) more letters 
than they can report. But Sperling then tested subjects in a further 'partial report' 
condition. This showed that if rapidly asked instead for the letters in any given 
row (the top, middle, or bottom) subjects could quite accurately respond, 
regardless of which row was chosen. What this (at least taken in the context of 
the subjects' own experiential reports)  suggests to Block (and see also Dretske 
(2006), Fodor (2007)) is that detailed  and consciously encoded information 
about each and every letter was temporarily available to drive report and 
noticing (if attention were rapidly to be so directed) even though the 
subsequent selection of some letters to thus report renders the rest unavailable. 
That is to say, the initial experience contained more phenomenal information 
than (perhaps for reasons having to do with limitations on working memory) 
any full report can subsequently display. 
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In more recent studies (Landman et al (2003)) subjects were shown 8 oriented 
rectangles for half a second, then a gray screen, then the array of 8 but were 
informed that one rectangle may have changed orientation. Subjects were able 
to keep track of the orientation of about four rectangles from the group of 
eight (so their 'capacity measure' was 4) . Yet, much like the Sperling subjects, 
many of them reported seeing the specific orientation of all eight rectangles.  
Once again, a partial report condition seems to bear out the subject's claim. If 
the experimenter adds a pointer on the gray screen to ask the orientation 
question of any given rectangle, subjects can track almost all the rectangles 
(they display a capacity measure up to 6 or 7). The explanation once again,  
according to Block, is that the initial phenomenal experience contains more 
information than the full report condition can displayxiv.  
 
With these results in mind, Block's (2007) strategy is then to display a 
neuroscientific story concerning strong back-of-the-head neural coalitions 
(involving pockets of recurrent processing - see Lamme (2006)) that 
nonetheless just fail to win a winner-take-all competition for broadcast to the 
'global workspace' (recall note 11) and hence for reportability. Such a story 
(which I shall not attempt properly to rehearse here) is meant to make sense of 
the claim that in these (and in many other) cases phenomenal consciousness 
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'overflows' cognitive accessibility and thus that we can (and do) have 
experiences even in cases where we lack the kind of access that would yield 
some form of report that such and such an experience had occurred.  
 
The point I want to notice is that this argument (which is actually a form of 
inference to the best explanation) takes as its starting point the assertion that 
the only grounds we have for treating the just-losing  coalitions as non-conscious 
is the unreportability of the putative perceptual experiences. But perhaps this is 
premature. For underlying the appeal to reportability is, I suggest, a deeper and 
perhaps more compelling access-oriented concern. It is the concern, raised in 
the previous section, that any putative conscious experience should be the 
experience of an agent.  
 
Can we really make sense of the image of free-floating experiences, of little 
isolated islets of experience that are not even potentially more widely available 
to act as fodder for a creature's rational choices and considered actions?  Evans’ 
insight was that the notions of conscious experience and reasoned agency (here 
very broadly construed) are deeply intertwined: that there are non-negotiable 
links between what is given in conscious awareness and the enabled sweep of 
deliberate actions and choices available to a reasoning subject. One way to 
begin to flesh this out (see e.g. Dretske (2006)) is, as we saw, to depict 
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conscious perceptual experience as providing an agent with self-transparent 
reasons for her own actions. Such a story opens up a different way of 
interpreting the Sperling and the Landman et al results. In these cases subjects 
report phenomenally registering all the items because information concerning 
each item was, at that moment, available to be deployed in the service of 
deliberate, reasoned, goal-directed action. Responses selected on the basis of 
this information would meet the key condition of being self-transparently 
grounded in the agent's perceptual connection to the world (for more on this 
idea, see Clark (2001)). Such momentary potentiality is not undermined by the 
(interesting and important) fact that the selection of a few items to actually play 
that role then precludes the selection of the rest. Contrariwise, Block argues 
that a subject such as  GK (Rees et al (2000) (2002)) suffering from visuo-
spatial extinction may be having an experience of a face and yet it be 
impossible for him, qua agent, to know anything of this experience.  This is 
because Block takes GK’s phenomenal experience to consist in recurrent 
processing in the fusiform face area.  My suggestion, following Evans' would be 
that GK can be consciously experiencing a face only if the information given in 
the putative experience is at least momentarily poised in a way that makes it apt 
for use (though it need not actually be used) in the agent's personal level 
reasoning, planning and for the deliberate and goal-driven selection action.  In 
that way the link to agency is maintained. Recurrent processing in the fusiform 
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area will no doubt prove to be among the many conditions necessary (but not 
sufficient) for realizing a state that plays this distinctive causal role. Block's just-
losing coalitions fail to trigger winning frontal coalitions and hence fail to be in 
a position to contribute their contents in this manner to the full sweep of the 
agent’s deliberate acts and choices. It is this fact (rather than the related but 
admittedly more superficial and unreliable indicator of mere non-reportability) 
that should motivate our treating the contents of the just-losing coalitions as 
non-conscious.  
 
Perhaps, though, the very idea of clean facts hereabouts (facts concerning what 
does and does not form part of our current  perceptual experience) is itself a 
deeply mistaken one. For it increasingly seems (and see Schwitzgebel (2008) for 
some compelling arguments to this effect) our grip on what it means for 
something to form part of our current conscious experience is tenuous at best. 
It is a grip compromised by our own congenital inability to know what we are 
experiencing without turning attention to it, or attempting to recollect it at a 
later moment, or introspecting upon it right now. Each such act alters the set 
of cognitive mechanisms in play, yet to eschew reliance on such methods tout 
court is to leave us with no anchor  points at all. It leaves us with no means by 
which to decide, for example, what subsets of behaviour and response to look 
for in other (e.g. non-verbal, non-human, or impaired) cases. In other words, it 
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seems we must make some antecedent decisions to get the experimental balls 
rolling, but that these decisions themselves cannot be checked because the 
experiments that do so must be interpreted according to some closely related, 
equally unverified, set of assumptions. From this one might conclude that there 
are facts here that are terminally resistant to scientific resolution. But a better 
conclusion, it seems to me, is that there are no such finer-grained facts here at 
allxv.  
 
Thus take, for example, the currently extremely 'live' question of the 
phenomenal status of currently unattended visual stuff. Is such unattended 
stuff phenomenally experienced at the time, or is it at best poised to feed 
phenomenal experience (or perhaps merely to inform memory) at some later 
moment? Wright (2006) argues, convincingly it seems to me, that this question 
is unanswerable in the present state of the science. But more importantly, he 
also suggests that the question itself is relatively scientifically uninteresting. 
What matters, Wright argues, is getting a firm grip on what contribution is 
made by various systems and sub-systems, and how those contributions enable 
us to maintain fluent contact with, and interact successfully with, the world. In 
getting such a grip, we are not forced to resolve questions concerning the 
phenomenal status of unattended visual stuff.  
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The final view that I want to display, then, is one that we may call the Mere 
Motley  model of conscious perceptual experience. According to this model the 
phrase 'conscious visual experience' is just a rough and ready label for a 
typically integrated, but potentially highly dissociable, complex of capacities. 
Some of these involve recall and report, some involve attention and noticing, 
others ( if Block and Lamme are right) involve only various forms of recurrent-
processing amplified neural activity.  Such a model would be an instance of 
what Sloman (2007) calls a “‘labyrinthine’ theory according to which visual 
experience is itself highly structured and multiply layered, such that different 
combinations of the many bits of the labyrinth determine different (often 
dissociable) aspects and nuances of what we have come to think of as 'our 
visual experience'.  Much the same picture, again based upon theoretical 
apparatus and insights from work in artificial intelligence and robotics, is 
endorsed in Ballard (2007). Conscious visual experience, if such views are 
correct, is not usefully understood via the metaphor of a single inner light that 
is either on or off  (compare: one leading voice) but consists instead in a motley 
swathe of surprisingly dissociable elements and effects, relative to which 
pressing the simple binary question ("is conscious visual experience occurring 
or not?") is just a recipe for trouble and confusion. The most famous defence 
of such a view is probably Dennett's (1991) 'multiple drafts' model of conscious 
experience, according to which the only real facts hereabouts concern the ways 
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the system would respond to various kinds of probe made at various points in 
the ongoing cycle of processing. But the eseential core of the view (which I 
take to be the assertion of motley processing with no simple facts of the matter 
concerning the presence or absence of conscious experience in many cases) 
may be developed in many different ways. 
 
7. Conclusions: Still Revealing After All These Years? 
 
In the light of all this, what is most clearly right and important in the strong 
dual visual systems model is the claim that ventral stream processing (along 
with some of the highest levels of what Jeannerod and Jacob call 'pragmatic 
processing) preferentially determine what might be called our 'reflective take on 
our own visual experience'. That is to say, such processing is preferentially 
involved in the way our own visual experience presents itself to us: to rational, 
reflective agents motivated by a variety of plans, goals, and projects. But step 
outside that self-reflective arena, however, and the landscape changes 
dramatically. If experience, or some varieties of experience, outrun report, and 
dissociate from processes of top-down attention and consolidation into agent-
memory (perhaps occurring simply courtesy of recurrent processing in 
encapsulated pockets of the cognitive economy) then all bets are off.  Worse 
still, we may be forced to embrace what I have called a Mere Motley model of 
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conscious experience, according to which there is simply no answer to 
questions concerning (for example) the phenomenal status ('seen or unseen') of 
what Wright (2006) calls 'unattended visual stuff'. Instead, 'visual experience' 
would depend on a messy, multi-faceted web of processing that links us 
variously to the world: a web of processing that we probe in various ways and 
on various time-scales, some of which inevitably recruit processing in ways tied 
up with report, memory, attention, and noticing, and others of which do not. 
 
Milner and Goodale have done more than just about anyone else to bring these 
foundational issues into focus, involving neuroscientists, cognitive 
psychologists, AI researchers, philosophers, and many others in what has 
become one of the most exciting, important, and productive debates in recent 
decades. On those increasingly elusive questions concerning the nature and 
neural underpinnings of conscious visual experience itself, the jury (it seems to 
me) remains out. But whatever the outcome, there is no doubting the value and 
impact of the dual visual systems model itself: still revealing after all these years. 
 
 
 
* Thanks to Robert McIntosh, Tim Bayne, Thomas Schenk, Michael Tye, 
Matthew Nudds, Mog Stapleton, Julian Kiverstein, Simon Garrod, Steve 
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Draper, Liz Irvine, John Henderson, Ned Block, and Tillmann Vierkant for 
stimulating exchanges on these topics. Thanks too to the two referees, to all the 
participants in the Perception, Action and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and 
Dual Vision conference held at Bristol in July 2007, and to all the members of 
the Edinburgh Philosophy, Psychology and Informatics Reading Group for 
stimulating discussions. This paper was prepared thanks to support from the 
AHRC, under the ESF Eurocores CNCC scheme, for the CONTACT 
(Consciousness in Interaction) project, AH/E511139/1. 
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i Conversely, optic ataxics, with dorsal stream lesions, are adept at visually 
identifying objects that they cannot fluidly reach and grasp. Optic ataxics:  'have 
little trouble seeing [i.e. identifying] objects in a visual scene, but a lot of trouble 
reaching for objects they can see. It is as though they cannot use the spatial 
information inherent in any visual scene' Gazzaniga (1998) p. 109. 
 
 
ii For example, it has been shown that some visual illusions do affect 
visuomotor engagement. Importantly, however, this seems to be the case only 
when the illusion is rooted in very early stages of visual processing (in primary 
visual cortex) and is thus 'passed on' to both streams when they subsequently 
diverge (Dyde and Milner (2002) Milner and Dyde (2003)). This is, of course, 
fully compatible with the strong dual systems view. Moreover, several other 
perceptual illusions have subsequently been shown to affect conscious 
experience without impactingii visumotor acts of grasp scaling and reaching 
including the Ponzo ('railway lines') and Müller-Lyer illusions (see Goodale and 
Milner (2004) p. 89). In such cases, motor effects are observed when delays are 
introduced between viewing the illusion and producing the motor response. 
But this is as predicted by the model, which treats time-delayed actions as 
'pantomimed' in that they cannot rely on the here-and-now computations of 
the dorsal stream and are instead driven by the illusion-prone deliverances of 
the ventral stream (see Milner and Goodale (1995) pp. 170-173). 
 
iii In addition, some aspects of online object engagement may require ongoing 
ventral stream effort (grip force (Jackson and Shaw), functionally informed 
grips (Goodale and Milner (2004)), complex object engagements (McIntosh et 
al (2004)) 
 
iv One residual issue hereabouts, which I won't attempt to resolve in this 
treatment, concerns the nature of these projected additional elements of 
conscious experience. Is the 'feeling of presence' truly part of my visual 
experience? Is the width information available to DF for form discrimination 
really given to her as some (perhaps weak or indeterminate?) form of visual 
experience? Does the meaningfulness of a visually presented action really 
belong to the visual experience itself?  
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v This analogy was originally suggested to me by an anonymous referee for 
Clark (2007). 
 
vi The actual story is a little more complex, since 'pragmatic' visuomotor 
representations are said (op cit p.3) to have a hybrid direction of fit, insofar as 
they also provide motor intentions with information about what actions the 
world affords.  
 
vii Jeannerod and Jacob go on to suggest a further decomposition of function 
within the parietal lobe/dorsal pathway, with varying admixtures of directions 
of fit and causation associated with the various functions. The superior partietal 
lobule, they suggest, is concerned with visuomotor processing, while the right 
inferior parietal lobule deals with the perception of spatial relationships, and the 
left inferior lobule with representations of goal-directed actions. Both these 
latter roles, they argue, are plausibly associated with certain contents of 
conscious visual experience. 
 
 
 
viii Similarly Mathen's comments on the 'feeling of presence' are probably best 
seen as a kind of restricted version of Nudds' claim (restricted insofar as the 
only contribution the directive contents make to experience is, on Matthen's 
account, the addition of that sense of presence). 
 
ix It is worth noting here that DF retains descriptive visual experience of colour 
and texture, and thus knows when there is an object out there, and what kind 
of surface (shiny, dull etc) it has. This is what is usually taken to explain her 
ability to self-initiate actions, and thus already distinguishes her quite sharply (in 
terms of practical action) from blindsight patients.  
 
 
x Tim Bayne (personal communication) suggests that the directive content 
described by Nudds, insofar as it is indeed consciously experienced, may be 
best thought of as 'motor intentional' rather than genuinely visual. This is an 
interesting suggestion, but one that I shall not pursue in the present context. 
 
xi Versions of this suggestion are found in Evans (1982), Marcel (1983), Milner 
and Goodale (1995), Goodale and Milner (2004), Hurley (1998), Clark (2001), 
Jacob and Jeannerod (2003), Dretske (2006), Clark (2007) 
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xii Thus according to  'global workspace' theory (Barrs (1988) (1997), Dehaeane 
et al (1998), Dennett (2001), Metzinger (2003) etc) information becomes 
conscious when it is poised for dissemination to many cortical areas (perhaps 
via long-range white matter pathways linking cortical areas- see Dehaene and 
Naccache (2001)). Information  poised for such widespread dissemination 
(information 'in the global workspace') will ipso facto be poised for the control 
of an open-ended variety of rational responses, including report where 
available, so the global workspace model can be seen as providing one 
mechanism by means of which a strong link to personal-level agency may be 
implemented in the brain. 
 
xiii These experiments are also discussed in Dretske (2006) and Fodor (2007). 
 
xiv For some interesting worries, see  Byrne, Hilbert and Siegel (2008). 
 
xv Schwitgebel's position (personal communication) is that although he can see 
how the arguments might be taken this way, he himself finds it compelling that 
there must be a clean fact of the matter concerning e.g. the richness, or lack of 
it, of ongoing visual experience, and that this will be so even if that fact turns 
out to be permanently resistant to scientific resolution.  
 
